University of Pennsylvania

ScholarlyCommons
Finance Papers

Wharton Faculty Research

2001

Equilibrium Unemployment
Joao F. Gomes
University of Pennsylvania

Jeremy Greenwood
Sergio Rebelo

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.upenn.edu/fnce_papers
Part of the Finance Commons, and the Finance and Financial Management Commons

Recommended Citation
Gomes, J. F., Greenwood, J., & Rebelo, S. (2001). Equilibrium Unemployment. Journal of Monetary
Economics, 48 (1), 109-152. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0304-3932(01)00071-X

This paper is posted at ScholarlyCommons. https://repository.upenn.edu/fnce_papers/356
For more information, please contact repository@pobox.upenn.edu.

Equilibrium Unemployment
Abstract
A search-theoretic model of equilibrium unemployment is constructed and shown to be consistent with
the key regularities of the labor market and business cycle. The two distinguishing features of the model
are: (i) the decision to accept or reject jobs is modeled explicitly, and (ii) markets are incomplete. The
model is well suited to address a number of interesting policy questions. Two such applications are
provided: the impact of unemployment insurance, and the welfare costs of business cycles.

Disciplines
Finance | Finance and Financial Management

This journal article is available at ScholarlyCommons: https://repository.upenn.edu/fnce_papers/356

Equilibrium Unemployment&

Joao Gomesa, Jeremy Greenwoodb and Sergio Rebelo∗,c
February, 2001 – Revised

a Department

of Finance, The Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania,
Philadelphia, PA 19104, USA
b Department of Economics, University of Rochester, Rochester, NY 14627, USA
c Department of Finance, J.L. Kellogg Graduate School of Management,
Northwestern University, Evanston, IL 60208, USA
Abstract
A search-theoretic model of equilibrium unemployment is constructed and shown
to be consistent with the key regularities of the labor market and business cycle.
The two distinguishing features of the model are: (i) the decision to accept or
reject jobs is modeled explicitly, and (ii) markets are incomplete. The model is
well suited to address a number of interesting policy questions. Two such
applications are provided: the impact of unemployment insurance, and the
welfare costs of business cycles.
Key Words: Search; Incomplete Markets; Business Cycles; Unemployment
Insurance; Welfare Costs of Business Cycles.
JEL Classifications: E24, E32
∗ Corresponding

author. Tel: 847-467-2329; Fax: 847-491-5719; E-mail:
s-rebelo@kellogg.nwu.edu

& Acknowledgments: The authors thank Richard Rogerson, the editor, for
detailed comments. Nancy Stokey and several referees also provided helpful
suggestions. Financial support from the CEPR and the NSF is gratefully
acknowledged.
Running Headline: Equilibrium Unemployment
J. Gomes, J. Greenwood and S. Rebelo/Journal of Monetary Economics

1

Introduction

What determines the rate of unemployment and its movement over the business cycle? In
the U.S. economy the unemployment rate moves countercyclically. So too does the average duration of unemployment, implying that it is easier to find a job in booms than in
busts. Furthermore, the flows into and out of unemployment are positively correlated and
move countercyclically. Are these key facts about unemployment behavior consistent with
a general equilibrium labor search model in which individual job opportunities are aﬀected
by both aggregate and idiosyncratic shocks? Such a framework constitutes a natural model
of the equilibrium rate of unemployment, and as such, perhaps is the ideal laboratory to
examine such questions as the impact of unemployment insurance and the cost of business
cycles.
The model in this paper is constructed along the lines of the classic search-theoretic
models of unemployment developed by Lucas and Prescott (1974) and Jovanovic (1987).1
A distinguishing feature of these models is that workers must choose whether to work or not
at the prevailing wage. In the current paper, employed agents decide whether to keep their
current job opportunities or search for better ones. Unemployed agents have to pick between
accepting employment or continuing search. This model of job search is embedded into an
Aiyagari (1994), Huggett (1997) and Laitner (1992) style model of incomplete markets. An
individual’s job opportunities are subject to both idiosyncratic and aggregate shocks. Agents
cannot completely insure themselves against these shocks, given the lack of an Arrow-DebreuMcKenzie contingent-claims market. The best they can do is to smooth the eﬀects of these
shocks by borrowing and lending on an economy-wide capital market using bonds, subject
to a borrowing constraint. Given the lack of full insurance, unemployment is meaningful in
the sense that the unemployed are generally worse oﬀ than the employed.
The model is simulated to see if it can rationalize some key features of the U.S. labor
market, both at the micro and macro levels. At the micro level the model has little trouble
1

During the last decade there has been a resurgence of interest in unemployment models. The literature
on search and matching models is reviewed in the Appendix.
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matching the average rate and duration of unemployment observed in the U.S. economy.
It does reasonably well matching some stylized facts about the eﬀect of job displacement
on subsequent labor earning and future job displacements. The model also does well at
predicting individual income and consumption dynamics. At the macro level the searchtheoretic paradigm presented here is consistent with the cyclical regularities of aggregate
consumption, investment and output. It also does a good, but not perfect, job matching the
business cycle facts governing the rate and duration of unemployment, and the flows into
and out of both employment and unemployment.
Two applications illustrate the utility of the developed framework. The first quantifies
the eﬀects of unemployment insurance benefits. Changes in the level of benefits are found to
have a large impact on both the unemployment rate and its average duration. The second
application analyzes the welfare eﬀects of economic fluctuations. Despite the presence of
incomplete markets, business cycles can actually improve welfare in the search-theoretic
paradigm developed here.
Here is an itinerary for the rest of the trip. Section 2 develops the model and provides
some theoretical results. The model is then parameterized and calibrated in Section 3. The
results for the calibrated version of the model are presented in Sections 4 and 5. Findings
at the micro level are discussed in Section 4, and then attention turns to those at the macro
level in Section 5. The model’s implications for the welfare costs of unemployment insurance
and business cycles are also addressed in these sections. Some concluding remarks are oﬀered
in Section 6, which takes stock of the main findings and discusses possible extensions for the
model.

2

The Model

The economy is populated by a continuum of individuals distributed over the unit interval.
Each agent seeks to maximize the expected value of lifetime utility:

1

E0

∞
P

t=0

β t U(e
ct − D(lt )), 0 < β < 1,

where e
c and l represent consumption and labor eﬀort in the current period. The function

D(l) has the property D(0) = 0. For future reference it is useful to define consumption net
of the disutility of working as

c=e
c − D(l).

When employed, each agent derives income from working and past savings in the form
of physical capital. Income can be used for consumption, saving for the future, and to pay
taxes. The unemployed live oﬀ of past savings and unemployment insurance. An unemployed
agent does not pay taxes. Agents can borrow and lend freely in an economy-wide capital
market at the real rate of interest, r, subject to a borrowing constraint: the level of assets, a,
has to be greater than a minimum level a so as to ensure that there is no default. A worker
divides his time between work and leisure. In addition, physical capital depreciates at rate
δ.
At the beginning of each period, every agent has a job opportunity represented by the
production function O(k, l; ε, λ), where l and k are inputs of labor and capital, and ε and
λ represent aggregate and idiosyncratic technology shocks, respectively. An agent uses his
own labor eﬀort to operate the project. He rents capital from a competitive capital market
at a rental rate of (r + δ). If the agent chooses to take this job opportunity he will earn
labor income in the amount

max [O(k, l; ε, λ) − (r + δ)k].
k

The aggregate technology shock is drawn from the distribution function F (λ0 |λ) ≡

Pr[λt+1 ≤ λ0 |λt = λ]; this is common to all production technologies in the economy. The
2

function F is decreasing in λ (in the sense of first-order stochastic dominance).2

The

idiosyncratic shock for this job opportunity evolves according to the distribution function
G(ε0 |ε) ≡ Pr[εt+1 ≤ ε0 |εt = ε], which is decreasing in ε. Take this distribution function as
satisfying the Feller property.3

Agents are free to accept or reject their employment/production opportunities. Agents
who decide to operate this technology are defined as employed. Unemployed agents do not
work in the current period and search for a new production opportunity that comes on line
next period. To simplify, assume that search is eﬀortless and that a searcher cannot obtain
more job oﬀers or better job prospects by increasing the eﬀort devoted to search. In addition,
suppose that it is not possible to search on the job.
The timing of events is as follows. At the beginning of each period an agent has a job
opportunity described by the pair (ε, λ). Depending on the values of ε and λ he will decide to
accept or reject this opportunity. If the agent accepts it he earns labor income in the amount
O(k, l; ε, λ) − (r + δ)k. He pays lump-sum taxes in the amount τ . In addition, he receives
the amount ra in rental income, where a denotes the units of physical capital accumulated
by the agent. Given his capital and labor income, each agent decides how much to consume
and save. Denote the value of the agent’s idiosyncratic shock for the next period by ε0 . If
the agent accepts the current job opportunity, then ε0 will be drawn from the distribution
G(ε0 |ε).
If the individual instead rejects the job opportunity, he searches for a new production
technology. The simplest job sampling rule is to allow a searching agent to sample one new
job prospect per period. In line with simplicity, let the agent draw a new technology for
operation next period from the distribution function H(ε0 ). When the agent rejects his job
opportunity, he must live solely oﬀ his past savings, (1 + r)a, and unemployment insurance
benefits, µ.
In other words, if λ1 > λ2 then F (λ0 |λ1 ) ≤ F (λ0 |λ2 ), with the inequality holding strictly for some λ0 .
R
3
That is, for any continuous and bounded function X(·, ε) the function Ξ(·, ε) = X(·, ε0 )dG(ε0 |ε)dε0 is
also continuous and bounded.
2
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At the beginning of each period individuals decide whether to work or search. Clearly, the
values for the technology shocks, ε and λ, as well as the individual’s wealth, a, are relevant
for this decision. So too is the economy’s distribution of wealth since this determines the
rental rate on capital, r + δ. Let Z(a, ε) represent the cumulative distribution of agents
over the state (a, ε). Suppose that this distribution function evolves according to some
transition operator T so that Z 0 = TZ. The equilibrium interest rate will be a function of
the aggregate technology shock and the cross-sectional distribution of agents across states,
so that r = R(λ; Z). The government keeps unemployment insurance benefits fixed at the
amount µ, while balancing its budget on a period-by-period basis. Therefore taxes must
change with the state of the economy. Thus, let τ = T (λ; Z).
The expected lifetime utility of a worker and a searcher in state (a, ε, λ; Z) are represented
by W (a, ε, λ; Z) and S(a, λ; Z). Finally, Y (ε, λ; Z) is the income earned by a worker net of
the disutility of working so that
Y (ε, λ; Z) = max[O(k, l; ε, λ) − (r + δ)k − D(l)].
k,l

The decision rules for k and l are K(ε, λ; Z) and L(ε, λ; Z).
The choice problem for a worker is

W (a, ε, λ; Z) = max
{U (c)
0
c,a

+ β
subject to

R

max[W (a0 , ε0 , λ0 ; Z 0 ), S(a0 , λ0 ; Z 0 )]dG(ε0 |ε)dF (λ0 |λ)dε0 dλ0 },

c + a0 = Y (ε, λ; Z) + [1 + R(λ; Z)] a − T (λ; Z),

P(1)

(1)

a0 ≥ a,
c − D(L(ε, λ; Z)). The worker’s decision rules for c and a0 are
and Z 0 = TZ. Here c = e
C w (a, ε, λ; Z), and Aw (a, ε, λ; Z).

The programming problem for a searcher is
4

S(a, λ; Z) = max
{U (c) + β
0
c,a

R

max[W (a0 , ε0 , λ0 ; Z 0 ), S(a0 , λ0 ; Z 0 )]dH(ε0 )dF (λ0 |λ)dε0 dλ0 },
P(2)

subject to
c + a0 = [1 + R(λ; Z)] a + µ,
a0 ≥ a,
and Z 0 = TZ. Since searching requires no eﬀort both l and D(l) are zero for the searcher.
The searcher’s decision rules for consumption and asset accumulation read c = C s (a, λ; Z)
and a0 = As (a, λ; Z). The lemma below establishes some properties on W and S.
Lemma 1 The functions W and S exist, are continuously increasing in a, and W is continuously increasing in ε.
Proof. See Appendix.
Clearly, an agent will choose to work in the current period if W (a, ε, λ; Z) ≥ S(a, λ; Z);
otherwise he will search. Let Ω(a, ε, λ; Z) be the decision rule governing whether an individual works or not. This decision rule is specified by

 1, if W (a, ε, λ; Z) ≥ S(a, λ; Z),
Ω(a, ε, λ; Z) =
 0, otherwise.

(2)

An agent who finds himself in state (a, ε, λ; Z) will save the amount

a0 = A(a, ε, λ; Z) ≡ Ω(a, ε, λ; Z)Aw (a, ε, λ; Z) + (1 − Ω(a, ε, λ; Z))As (a, λ; Z).
Last, the government maintains a balanced budget each period. This requires that
R
R
µ [1 − Ω(a, ε, λ; Z)]dZ(a, ε)dadε = τ Ω(a, ε, λ; Z)dZ(a, ε)dadε.

(3)

The lefthand side gives the amount of benefits paid to unemployed individuals while the
righthand side shows taxes paid by workers. Also, in a competitive equilibrium the demand
5

and supply of capital should always be equal. The market clearing condition for the capital
market reads
R

K(ε, λ; Z)Ω(a, ε, λ; Z)dZ(a, ε)dadε =

R

adZ(a, ε)dadε.

(4)

The total demand for capital by working agents is represented by the lefthand side of the
above the expression, while the righthand side gives the total supply from all agents.
The model’s competitive equilibrium is defined now.
Definition A competitive equilibrium is a set of decisions rules, Aw , L, K, As , Ω, a set
of value functions, W , S, pricing and tax functions, R and T , and a law of motion for the
aggregate wealth distribution, Z 0 = TZ, such that:
1. The decision rules Aw , L, and K, and value function W , solve problem P(1), given
the functions S, R, T and T.
2. The decision rule As , and value function S, solve problem P(2), given the functions
W , R, T and T.
3. The work/search decision rule, Ω, is determined by (2), given W and S.
4. The government’s budget balances and the capital market clears so that (3) and (4)
hold.
5. The law of motion for the economy-wide distribution of wealth, or Z 0 = TZ, is described by
Z 0 (a0 , ε0 ) =

R

{I(A(a, ε, λ; Z) − a0 )[Ω(a, ε, λ; Z)G(ε0 |ε)

+(1 − Ω(a, ε, λ; Z))H(ε0 )]dZ(a, ε)dadε},

(5)

where I(x) = 1 if x ≤ 0 and I(x) = 0 otherwise.

2.1

Steady-State Results — No Aggregate Uncertainty

The presence of the max[W, S] operation on the righthand side of P(1) and P(2) greatly
complicates the analysis of the model. Still with a few assumptions (satisfied in the computational results) some intuition about the model’s economic mechanisms can be developed.
6

Define J(a) as the value of the shock ε at which an agent is indiﬀerent between working and
searching. Formally this job threshold rule is defined by the equation
(6)

W (a, J(a)) = S(a),

where λ and Z have been dropped from the value functions given the focus on a deterministic
steady state. Since W is monotonically increasing and continuous in ε, J will be a function
and
W (a, ε) R S(a) as ε R J(a).
To further develop intuition (in a heuristic way) make the following assumption:
Assumption W and S are C 1 functions.
By the implicit function theorem it then follows that J(a) is a C 1 function too. It transpires
that P(1) and P(2) will have the form
{U(Y (ε) + (1 + r)a − τ − a0 ) + β[S(a0 )G(J(a0 )|ε) +
W (a, ε) = max
0
a ≥a

R

J(a0 )

W (a0 , ε0 )dG(ε0 |ε)dε0 ]},

and
S(a) = max
{U ((1 + r)a + µ − a0 ) + β[S(a0 )H(J(a0 )) +
0
a ≥a

R

W (a0 , ε0 )dH(ε0 )dε0 ]}.

J(a0 )

Using the envelope theorem it then follows that
W1 (a, ε) = U1 (Y (ε) + (1 + r)a − τ − a0 )(1 + r) = U1 (C w (a, ε))(1 + r),

(7)

S1 (a) = U1 ((1 + r)a + µ − a0 )(1 + r) = U1 (C s (a))(1 + r).

(8)

and

These two conditions can be used to gain some useful information about the consumption
behavior of workers and searchers.
7

Lemma 2 C w and C s are strictly increasing in a if and only if W and S are strictly concave
in a.
Proof. Immediate from conditions (7) and (8) together with the fact that U1 is decreasing.
Decreasing marginal utility of wealth associated with strict concavity is a natural property
for this type of environment, and it holds in all simulations of the model presented. Unfortunately, this cannot be established as a theoretical property of the model. The problem is
that the function max[W, S] appearing on the righthand side of P(1) and P(2) may not be a
concave function of a even if W and S are. Note that the presence of the idiosyncratic shock
can be used to smooth out the kinks in the value functions that are due to the max[W, S]
operation and allows strict concavity in W and S to be obtained. The Appendix discusses
this in more detail.
The next lemma establishes that workers consume more than searchers, ceteris paribus,
and that wealthier agents are choosier about the jobs they accept?
Lemma 3 J1 (a) R 0 and C w (a, J(a)) R C s (a) if and only if S1 (a) R W1 (a, J(a)).
Proof. By applying the implicit function theorem to (6) it follows that J(a) is increasing
in a if and only if S1 (a) > W1 (a, J(a)) since J1 (a) = [S1 (a) − W1 (a, J(a))]/W2 (a, J(a)).
Equations (7) and (8) imply C w (a, J(a)) R C s (a) as S1 (a) R W1 (a, J(a)).

Corollary 4 C w (a, ε) > C s (a), if S1 (a) > W1 (a, J(a)), W1 is decreasing in ε, and ε ≥ J(a).
Proof. From (7) it transpires that C w (a, ε) is increasing in ε if and only if W1 is decreasing
in ε. Now, when ε = J(a) an agent is indiﬀerent between working and searching and
C w (a, ε) > C s (a) by the previous lemma and the assumption that S1 (a) > W1 (a, J(a)). For
higher values of ε the agent still prefers to work, and his consumption will be even larger
given that W1 is decreasing in ε.
Consider the case where S1 (a) > W1 (a, J(a)). At the job threshold an extra unit of wealth
will be worth more to a searcher than a worker. Intuitively, this property would seem likely
since a searcher must live solely oﬀ of his assets. It holds in all of the simulations conducted.
Here wealthy agents will be choosier about accepting job opportunities. One interpretation
8

of this result is that richer people are more willing to undertake riskier activities [Danforth
(1979)]. Also, in this situation an agent will experience a drop in consumption upon crossing
the threshold from work to search. It also seems natural that W1 should be strictly decreasing
in ε. For a worker a higher value for the shock implies higher current income, and a greater
likelihood of higher future income, so that an extra unit of savings should be worth less. If
this condition holds, a worker’s consumption must always exceed a searcher’s for the same
level of wealth. Again, this property holds for all the experiments conducted.
The upshot of the above analysis is summarized below.4
Proposition 5 C w (a, ε) > C s (a) [when ε ≥ J(a)] and J(a) is strictly increasing in a,
provided that W and S are strictly concave functions with S1 (a) > W1 (a, J(a)), and W1 is
decreasing in ε.
These properties are portrayed in Figure 1, which plots data obtained from the simulated
model.
Agents in the model are unable to insure perfectly against the possibility of becoming
unemployed. Upon becoming unemployed they experience a drop in consumption. This
clearly may aﬀect an agent’s saving behavior. Aiyagari (1994), Huggett (1997) and Laitner
(1992) have illustrated how the presence of borrowing constraints in a model with heterogeneous agents leads to over savings in the sense that the equilibrium interest rate lies below
the rate of time preference. Their argument would appear to apply here too.5

Thus, one

4

If W and S are strictly concave functions then a slight modification of the Benveniste and Scheinkman
theorem (to allow for the borrowing constraint) can be used to show that these functions are continuously
diﬀerentiable in a [see Aiyagari (1994)].
5
A worker’s asset accumulation is determined by the eﬃciency condition U1 (C w (a, ε)) ≥ β(1 +
R
R J(a0 )
r)[ J(a0 ) U1 (C w (a0 , ε0 ))dG(ε0 |ε)dε0 +
U1 (C s (a0 ))dG(ε0 |ε)dε0 ]. Likewise, the searcher’s asset accumuR
R J(a0 )
U1 (C s (a0 ))dH(ε0 )dε0 ].
lation is governed by U1 (C s (a)) ≥ β(1 + r)[ J(a0 ) U1 (C w (a0 , ε0 ))dH(ε0 )dε0 +
These equations hold with equality whenever the borrowing constraint does not bind. Next, integrate
both sides of the worker’s Euler equation with respect to the stationary distribution Z over the part
of the state space applying to him. Perform the analogous operation on the searcher’s Euler equation. Sum the resulting equations. Use the definition of a stationary distribution on the righthand
R R
R J(a)
side of the resulting expression to get { J(a) U1 (C w (a, ε))dZ(a, ε)dε +
U1 (C s (a))dZ(a, ε)dε}da ≥
0
R R
R
J(a )
β(1 + r) { J(a0 ) U1 (C w (a0 , ε0 ))dZ(a0 , ε0 )dε0 +
U1 (C s (a0 ))dZ(a0 , ε0 )dε0 }da0 . But this can only hold if
β(1 + r) ≤ 1 (assuming that the integrals are bounded). If the set of liquidity constrained agents has

9

cannot assume that in a steady state without aggregate risk r = 1/β − 1.

3

Calibration

The quantitative properties of the model’s competitive equilibrium cannot be established
analytically and must be developed via simulation. This task is made diﬃcult by: (i) the
form of programming problems P(1) and P(2) that are not readily amenable to linearization
or linear-quadratic approximation techniques; and (ii) the necessity to include some measure
of the cross-sectional distribution of wealth as a state variable. Computing the competitive
equilibrium involves three steps. The first is to impose restrictions on the model’s functional
forms. The second is to determine as many parameters as possible either by matching
properties of the model to U.S. data or by using prior empirical evidence. The last step is to
develop a numerical algorithm capable of approximating the competitive equilibrium up to
an arbitrarily small error. The first and second part of this procedure are described below.
The numerical algorithm employed to simulate the competitive equilibrium is detailed in the
Appendix.
The time period chosen for decision making is six weeks. This short time horizon seems
appropriate given that the average duration of unemployment is about one quarter. Since
most macro-data is only available at the quarterly frequency, the output of the model was
aggregated up to this frequency. The functional forms for the production technology, the
utility function and the stochastic processes for the shocks are described next.

3.1

Preferences

The momentary utility function is
U (e
c − D(l)) =

(e
c−

l1+θ 1−σ
)
1+θ

1−σ

−1

,

θ > 0, σ > 0.

(9)

strictly positive measure then the inequality is strict, implying that (1 + r) < 1/β. Thus, the possibility of
over-accumulation continues to hold for this economy despite the presence of search. This argument was
developed in Huggett (1997).

10

Preferences of this sort can be obtained from a more general setup with home production, as Benhabib, Rogerson and Wright (1991) show. In models of labor contracting, the
employed typically end up worse oﬀ than the nonemployed. Nosel, Rogerson and Wright
(1992) illustrate how these preferences can rectify this problem in the well-known Rogerson
(1988) /Hansen (1985) indivisible labor model. These preferences are also useful in obtaining a countercyclical trade balance in models of small open economies, something that has
proven diﬃcult for the standard form of preferences, as Correia, Neves and Rebelo (1995)
demonstrate. Last, Devereux, Gregory and Smith (1992) show how this utility function can
rationalize the observed pattern of comovement in income and consumption across countries.
The parameters σ and θ can be interpreted as the coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion
and the (inverse) labor supply elasticity. Therefore, σ was set equal to 2, a value within the
acceptable range specified by Mehra and Prescott (1985), and θ was set equal to 10, implying
a labor supply elasticity of about 0.1, also reasonable according to Ghez and Becker (1975)
or MaCurdy (1981) for example. Finally, the intertemporal discount factor β was set to
1/1.061/8 , a value that is consistent with an equilibrium annual interest rate of (approximately) 6%.

3.2

Technology

The production function available to each individual is assumed to be

O(k, l; ε, λ) = exp(λ + ε)k α l1−α ,
where α denotes the share of capital in production. Following Cooley and Prescott (1995)
this share was set equal to 0.36, a value that is also consistent with the large majority of
related studies. The depreciation rate δ is set to 0.006 per period (approximately 5% per
annum), a value also consistent with the recommendations of Cooley and Prescott (1995).

3.3

Technology Shocks

Aggregate Shocks:
11

The properties of the aggregate technology shock, λ, are summarized by a three-point
Markov chain. This chain is chosen to approximate, using the Tauchen and Hussey (1990)
algorithm, an AR(1) process with serial correlation ρλ and standard deviation σ λ . Additionally, E[exp(λ)] = 1. The parameters ρλ and σ λ , are restricted by the requirement that the
stochastic process for the Solow residual generated by the model,

ln z = ln y − (1 − α) ln l,
roughly matches the first-order serial correlation coeﬃcient, ρz , and the standard deviation,
σ z , of the Solow residual, ln z, as computed by Cooley and Prescott (1995).6

Specifically,

Cooley and Prescott (1995) report that σ z = 0.0224 and ρz = 0.950, while the numbers
obtained here are σ z = 0.0216 and ρz = 0.905. Section 5 will discuss the fact that the
aggregate technology shock, λ, does not coincide with the logarithm of the Solow residual,
ln z.
Idiosyncratic Shocks:
The worker’s shock ε is assumed to evolve according to
ε0 = ρε ε + ξ,
where ξ ∼ N (0, σ 2ε ). A searcher draws a value of ε in line with
ε = ν,
where ν ∼ N (0, σ 2v ).
Notice that there are only three new parameters introduced relative to a standard real
business cycle model (ρε , σ ε , σ v ). The properties assumed for the idiosyncratic shocks
have implications for the average rate and duration of unemployment in the economy. The
parameters governing the stochastic processes for the idiosyncratic shocks are chosen to be
in accordance with two criteria. First, the model’s average rate of unemployment (6.1%)
6

The lower case bold letters denote aggregate variables.
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is close to the average U.S. unemployment rate (5.9%). Second, the average duration of
unemployment in the model (11 weeks) is also similar to the average duration in the U.S.
(13 weeks). These parameter values will also have implications for the model’s predictions
about income dynamics at the level of the individual. These predictions will be compared
with some evidence from the U.S. data in Section 4.2.

3.4

Government Policy

The final step in the calibration procedure is to specify the details of the unemployment
insurance policy. Unemployment compensation is fully described by the following policy for
transfers, µ:

 0,
µ=
 ηy∗ ,

if employed,
if unemployed,

where y∗ is the average (per capita) income in the economy without fluctuations and η can
be interpreted as the (average) replacement ratio. The value of η adopted was 0.5, which
provides a reasonable approximation to the U.S. unemployment insurance system according
to Hansen and Imrohoroglu (1992). Given this replacement ratio the requirement that the
government balances its budget in every period determines the equilibrium level of taxes in
the economy.
Table 1 summarizes the model’s baseline calibration.

4
4.1

Micro-Level Findings
Unemployment and Employment

What are the job prospects of an agent who becomes unemployed? To address this question,
turn oﬀ the aggregate technology shock (σ λ = 0) and focus on the resulting stationary distribution for the model. Figure 2 shows the cumulative hazard rates associated with exiting
from unemployment. Sixty five percent of agents exit the pool of unemployed one period after
13

entry with another 22% leaving after two periods. The model, therefore, is consistent with
the observation by Clark and Summers (1979) that a large fraction of unemployment spells
(79% in 1969, 60% in 1974 and 55% in 1975) end within one month. Hall (1995) argues that
the Clark-Summers exit rates exaggerate the extent to which it is easy to find employment
because they include workers who take temporary jobs. Those temporary jobs are, however,
also present in the model. There are workers who accept jobs with a short expected duration
because their productivity is just slightly above their reservation productivity.
Table 2 compares Ruhm’s (1991) estimates of the eﬀects of job displacement on the
subsequent level of earnings and future spells of unemployment with the model’s implications
for the same variables.7 This table shows that in the U.S. economy a displaced worker tends
to experience an additional 8.35 weeks of unemployment in the displacement year, 4.32 weeks
in the following year, etc. The model is consistent with the post-displacement behavior of
unemployment in the U.S. data. The eﬀects of entering the unemployment state on the wage
are slightly more severe in the model than in the data.
Dynarski and Sheﬀrin (1987) report that consumption drops when an individual becomes
unemployed. Gruber (1997) estimates the drop in food consumption to be 6.8% under the
current unemployment insurance system and 22% in its absence. These findings are usually
interpreted as evidence of the lack of full insurance against the possibility of unemployment.8
The model is consistent with this property of consumption behavior: in the model agents
reduce their annual consumption by 6% upon becoming unemployed.
A key implication of the model is that an agent’s threshold job productivity is increasing
in his financial wealth, a. Richer agents are more selective about the jobs that they are
willing to take. In a recent study Rendón (1996) has found empirical evidence for this eﬀect
7
One caveat with this comparison is that the Ruhm (1991) data excludes quits, including only workers
displaced as a result of plant closings and layoﬀs. Ideally the model’s implications should be compared with
the eﬀects of total job separations, not just displacements.
8

This consumption drop is consistent with complete markets, however, if the marginal utility of consumption is declining in leisure as in (9). This is not a property of standard utility functions such as a
Cobb-Douglas in consumption and leisure.
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in a sample of white male high school graduates who did not attend college.9
Finally, the model is consistent with the findings by Abraham and Farber (1987) and
Altonji and Shakotko (1987) that labor income increases modestly with tenure. While there
are other explanations for the eﬀect of tenure on wages, such as on-the-job learning, it is
worth noting that a search model can also generate this eﬀect. This results from the persistent character of the worker’s idiosyncratic shock. Workers who find a high-productivity
job are less likely to see their productivity fall below the job threshold in the near future.
In other words, workers in high-paying jobs are likely to remain there longer than workers
in low-paying ones. The slope of the regression of (ln) wages on tenure (measured in years)
generated by the model is 0.2%. This estimate compares well with the Abraham and Farber
(1987) one that labor earnings rise for every year on the job by 0.3% for blue collar nonunion
workers and 0.6% for managerial and professional nonunion ones.10

4.2

Income Dynamics

What are the model’s predictions for income dynamics? Income dynamics for an individual
are influenced by the idiosyncratic shock parameters ρε , σ ε , and σ v . The reasonableness of
the choices made for these parameters can be gauged by comparing the model’s predictions
for income dynamics with estimates from the U.S. data. Heaton and Lucas (1996) estimate
a process for individual income using annual data from the PSID for the period 1969-84.
They used an equation of the form11
ln(yit /yit−1 ) = υ 0 + υ 1 ln(yit−1 /yit−2 ) + υ 2 ln(yt /yt−1 ) + µit .
9

Rendón’s (1996) findings may be contaminated by unobserved human capital elements — for example
wealthier individuals may have more highly educated parents who devoted more time to their oﬀspring’s
education.
10

See equation 2 in Tables 4a and 4b.

11

Here yit denotes individual’s i income (which includes unemployment insurance) and yt is aggregate
income.
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This equation can also be estimated using simulated data from the model.12

To do this,

the model’s data must be aggregated up to the annual level. Like the Heaton and Lucas
(1996) study, the measure of income used includes unemployment insurance and taxes. The
results of this exercise are reported in Table 3. The model does fairly well in accounting for
most of the persistence and volatility in individual income.
Hubbard, Skinner and Zeldes (1995) also estimate the process governing individual income. They specify an AR(1) equation of the form ln(yit ) = ν 1 ln(yit−1 ) + µit . This equation
can also be estimated using time-aggregated simulated data from the model. The resulting
estimate is ν 1 = 0.50 and σ µi = 0.19. This compares with Hubbard, Skinner and Zeldes’s
(1995) estimate of ν 1 = 0.95 and σ µit = 0.14 for high school graduates (Table 2).13

Given

the high degree of persistence, the Hubbard, Skinner and Zeldes (1995) estimate implies
greater long-run variability in labor income than does the Heaton and Lucas (1996) one.
Given that the Heaton and Lucas (1996) and Hubbard, Skinner and Zeldes (1995) estimates
diﬀer, it is no surprise that the model can only match one of them.
The model’s ability to match the income and wealth statistics is very similar to that of
Aiyagari’s (1994) model.14 Here the coeﬃcient of variation in income across individuals is
√
0.21, a little below the value of 0.28 (= 0.241/ 1 − 0.5272 ) that obtains from the Heaton
and Lucas (1996) estimate in Table 3. As one might expect, however, the model can not
generate nearly enough skewness in the distribution of wealth. The Gini coeﬃcient for wealth
is only 0.38, significantly smaller than the value of 0.81 that Kessler and Wolﬀ (1991, Table
3) observe in the U.S. economy. Since the analysis abstracts from such important issues as
lifecycle savings, human capital formation and family dissolution, this is no surprise.
12

The aggregate shock is reintroduced here.

13

Unfortunately for the purposes here, they run this regression for diﬀerent education classes. Their
median estimate is focused on here.
14

The aggregate shock is now shut down again.
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4.3

Comparative Statics Results

Comparative statics experiments can provide some intuition regarding the economic mechanisms at work in the model. The qualitative results of these experiments are summarized
in Table 4. The discussion focuses on the parameters that exert the strongest influence on
the rate of unemployment – the replacement ratio, η, and the parameters that determine
the distribution of the idiosyncratic shocks, σ ν , ρε , and σ ε . The diﬀerent rows report the
new values of the unemployment rate that result from changing each individual parameter
to the value indicated.
4.3.1

Idiosyncratic shocks

If the variance of the worker’s shock, σ ε , is reduced it becomes less likely that a worker will
experience bad luck with his job. This reduces the number of agents engaging in job search,
lowering the rate of unemployment. Reducing σ ε by 20% results in a large decline in the
unemployment rate: a drop from 6.1% to 4.9%. Note that without idiosyncratic shocks there
would be no unemployment in the model. Nobody would expect that they could improve
their lot by quitting their current job and searching for a better one because all jobs would
be the same.
Reducing the persistence of the worker’s shock, ρε , lowers the rate of unemployment.
When shocks are less persistent a worker who receives a bad shock is less likely to remain
in a low-productivity state. This raises the opportunity cost of search. When ρε declines, a
worker who receives a high ε is less likely to remain highly productive for a longer period of
time. This lowers the rewards to searching. Both of these eﬀects conspire to make search
less attractive, lowering the unemployment rate. A small (5%) change in the persistence
parameter has a large impact on the equilibrium rate of unemployment.
A decline in the standard deviation of the searcher’s idiosyncratic shock, σ ν , reduces
the rate of unemployment because the value of search has now declined. The probability of
getting a good job has decreased. Note that while the odds of getting a bad job oﬀer have
also been reduced, the agent does not have to accept bad realizations of the idiosyncratic
17

shock. Thus, a decline in the variance of job seeker’s shock lowers the option value of search.
The message from the above experiments is that idiosyncratic shocks are important for
determining the equilibrium rate of unemployment. Thus, improving the calibration of the
idiosyncratic shock process is likely to be an important step for future research.
4.3.2

Application 1: The Role of Unemployment Insurance

An interesting application of this model is to study of the economic consequences of different unemployment insurance (UI) schemes. The benchmark replacement ratio is 50%, a
value consistent with the evidence for the U.S. In contrast, many European countries adopt
replacement ratios around 70% [Martin (1996)]. The model does not distinguish between
unemployment due to quits and layoﬀs. On the one hand, all job separations are voluntary
and could be labelled as quits. On the other hand, all separations are due to lost productivity and, on this account, could be viewed as layoﬀs.15

In reality only worker who get

laid oﬀ are eligible for unemployment benefits. Therefore, for this application it might have
been better to calibrate the model to the average rate and duration of unemployment due
to layoﬀs. With this caveat in mind, Table 4 illustrates that a change in the replacement
rate can have a dramatic eﬀect on the rate of unemployment. With this change alone the
model can account for most of the diﬀerence between the average unemployment rate in the
U.S. (6.1% in the benchmark calibration) and that of a typical European economy (13.9%).
The average duration of unemployment also rises from 11 weeks in the benchmark economy
to over 14 weeks in the high unemployment insurance model. About 20% of unemployment
spells now last at least 6 months. Finally, increasing the replacement rate leads to a decline
in welfare equal to 4.4% of consumption — net of the cost of supplying labor eﬀort.16
15

Suppose productivity fell close to zero. Is it reasonable to expect someone to work for next to nothing?
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This welfare loss was computed using the same procedure described in Section 5.2 to evaluate the
welfare costs of cyclical fluctuations.
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5

Macro-Level Findings

5.1

Business Cycle Facts

Solving the model with aggregate shocks requires keeping track of the evolution of the
wealth distribution, Z. In order to make their decisions, individuals have to forecast the
future values of the real interest rate. These values are influenced by the wealth distribution,
Z. The algorithm employed to compute the equilibrium of this economy is described in the
Appendix. It approximates the distribution Z by the mean level of wealth in the economy.
By (4) the mean level of wealth in the economy equals the aggregate capital stock, k.
The behavior of unemployment in the model depends critically on the response of the
threshold rule to an aggregate productivity shock. This rule now takes the form ε =
J(a, λ, Z) = J(a, λ, k). It is diﬃcult to predict theoretically the response of this threshold rule to a change in λ because there are two contradictory eﬀects at play. When λ rises,
the opportunity cost of search increases, which should lead to less search. Yet, since λ is
serially correlated, an increase in λ raises the conditional dispersion of future productivity
exp(ε0 +λ0 ). As the comparative statics experiments of Section 4.3 have shown, this increased
dispersion raises the option value of search, which should lead to more search. Figure 3 depicts the threshold rules for the three possible values of λ and for a value of k equal to the
mean value obtained in the simulations. This figure shows that the opportunity cost eﬀect
dominates: when λ increases the threshold line shifts downward, leading to less search.
In the model recessions have both a “cleansing” and a “sullying” eﬀect. These eﬀects can
be gleaned from Figure 3. The cleansing eﬀect of recessions results from the following. In
expansions, jobs with low idiosyncratic productivity are not abandoned because agents want
to take advantage of the temporarily high aggregate productivity. For any given level of assets
the threshold value for the idiosyncratic shock rises, other things equal. It is in recessions that
these low-productivity jobs are eliminated as workers search for better opportunities. The
sullying eﬀect of recessions results from wealth dropping during recessions, thus increasing

19

agents’ willingness to accept low-productivity jobs.17 As Figure 3 shows the threshold value
for the idiosyncratic shock falls with assets, ceteris paribus.18

Which eﬀect dominates on

net? The mean value of the idiosyncratic shock across workers moves countercyclically in
model. Its correlation with output is −0.82. Therefore, the cleansing eﬀect dominates.
The cleansing eﬀect has implications for the measurement of Solow residuals. Recall that
λ does not coincide with the logarithm of the Solow residual, measured as the logarithm of
aggregate output minus the product of labor’s share of income and total hours worked. The
source of the discrepancy is the cyclical movement in the threshold rule depicted in Figure 3.
In an expansion many low-ε production opportunities are retained, only to later be discarded
in a recession. Therefore the volatility of the measured Solow residual underestimates the
volatility of the true productivity shock.19

Hence, on this account, aggregate productivity

shocks may be larger than they appear to be.
Figures 5, 6, and 7 depict the average response of the system across all instances in the
1,500 agent, 10,000 period simulation in which the aggregate productivity shock transited
from its mean value to its high value. The diagrams portray the response of the system to
a 1% increase in the shock. Figures 8, 9, and 10 report the same information for transitions
from the mean value of the shock to its lowest value. These figures are analogous to impulse
response functions. They show clearly that the model is capable of retaining the successful
features of real business cycle models, in terms of the behavior of consumption, output
and investment, while, at the same time, being consistent with some key regularities of
17

Barlevy (2000) stresses an alternative mechanism (on-the-job search) that also generates a sullying
eﬀect of recessions.
18

Additionally, in recessions the aggregate capital stock falls. This lowers the threshold value for the
idiosyncratic shock as well. Figure 4 depicts the threshold rules for two values of k, the mean plus or minus
four standard deviations. An increase in the aggregate capital stock lowers the real interest rate. This
increases the probability that an individual will work for two reasons: (i) the rental price of capital drops,
raising the value of labor income associated with a given idiosyncratic productivity level; and (ii) it reduces
ra, thus lowering end-of-period wealth. The figure shows, however, that these eﬀects are quantitatively
small.
19

Recall that values of ρλ and σ 2λ were chosen so that the Solow residual, as conventionally measured using
simulated data generated by the model, exhibits roughly the same serial correlation and variance reported
by Cooley and Prescott (1995) for their estimate of the Solow residual for the U.S. economy.
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unemployment behavior.
Figures 6 and 9 show that unemployment is clearly countercyclical. This is what the
threshold rules in Figure 3 had suggested: workers are willing to accept a low-ε job when
aggregate productivity is high. The flow into unemployment declines in an expansion as
workers become less willing to quit their jobs. Average duration declines in the first period
as searchers become more inclined to accept low-ε oﬀers. Further declines take place up until
four periods, reflecting the fact that most of the agents who become unemployed in period one
accept jobs in periods two, three and four. The flow out of unemployment increases slightly
initially, as agents become employed to take advantage of the high aggregate productivity.
This flow subsequently declines as the number of unemployed workers is sharply reduced.
Table 5 shows that the volatility and comovement of consumption, output and investment
are similar to those in the U.S. data. In both Table 5 and Table 6, discussed below, the
model and U.S. data series are detrended using the Hodrick-Prescott filter with a smoothing
parameter of 1,600. The degree of amplification generated by the model can be measured in
two diﬀerent ways. The first measure is the ratio of the (HP-detrended) standard deviation
of output relative to the standard deviation of the Solow residual. This statistic is 0.59 for
Hansen’s (1985) standard divisible labor model and 0.51 for the baseline search model. The
second measure is the ratio of the (HP-detrended) standard deviation of output relative to
the standard deviation of true technology shocks. This statistic is 0.59 for the standard
model and 0.25 for the search model. According to the first measure the model provides
the same amplification as standard real business cycle (RBC) models, while according to
the second measure, the model provides much less amplification than RBC models. The
first-order serial correlation of (HP filtered) output in the model is 0.53, which is typical for
RBC models.
Table 6 confirms that the model reproduces the comovement patterns of labor market
variables that characterize U.S. data. Average hours and employment are procyclical, while
the unemployment rate, and the duration of unemployment are countercyclical. Employment
is a little less volatile in the model than it is in the data. A version of Okun’s law for the
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model economy implies that a fall in GDP by 2.1% corresponds to a 1% rise in unemployment.
This relation is thought to be 2 for 1 in the U.S. data.
One salient feature of labor market data is the countercyclical character of flows into and
out of unemployment. This feature has been documented for the U.S. [Davis, Haltiwanger
and Schuh (1996), Merz (1996)] and for several European countries [Burda and Wyplosz
(1994)]. The model matches the negative correlation between unemployment flows and
output and correctly predicts the relative magnitudes of these correlations. The model
generates too much volatility in these series, however, and implies a similar volatility for
inflows and outflows. Blanchard and Diamond (1990) stress that in the U.S. flows into
unemployment are more volatile than flows out of it. Merz (1996) has, however, recently
disputed these findings, arguing that the diﬀerence between the volatility in these two flows
is not statistically significant.
The model does a slightly better job in matching the volatility of flows into and out
of employment. It fails to replicate the procyclical nature of flows into employment (or the
negative correlation between employment inflows and outflows). There may be a good reason
for this failure. In the real world, many individuals may choose not to participate in the labor
force. Flows between employment and nonparticipation may be as large as flows between
employment and unemployment. The model does not permit nonparticipation. Hence, flows
into (out of) unemployment must equal flows out of (into) employment. Allowing for a home
state, along the lines Andolfatto and Gomme (1996), may improve the model’s ability to
match labor market flows.

5.2
5.2.1

Application 2: The Welfare Cost of Business Cycle Fluctuations
The Lucas (1987) Calculation

In a classic work, Lucas (1987) calculates the potential welfare benefits of business cycle
stabilization. To set the stage for the current analysis, it is fruitful to go through his
calculation for the model economy developed here. Imagine a representative agent living in
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world where aggregate consumption, e
c, follows some stationary stochastic process. Denote

c and σe2c . How much would the agent be
the long-run mean and variance of this process by e
willing to pay to eliminate all business cycle risk?

To answer this question, denote expected utility in a world with business cycles by20
E[

∞
P

β t U(e
ct )].

t=0

By taking a second-order Taylor expansion of the momentary utility function (and dropping
the remainder term), expected lifetime utility can be expressed as
E[

∞
P

t=0

β t U(e
ct )] '

1
{U(e
c) + U11 (e
c)σe2c /2}.
1−β

Thus, the per-period benefit (expressed in units of consumption as a fraction of average
consumption) from eliminating the variability in consumption is
1 U11 (e
c)σe2c
1
1e
cU11 (e
c) σe2c
1 σec 2
×
=
) , [cf. Lucas (1987, eq. 8)]
2 = σ(
2
2 U1 (e
2 e
e
c
U1 (e
c)
c) e
c
c

(10)

where σ is the coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion.21

In the model economy the coeﬃcient of variation for aggregate consumption, σec /e
c, is

0.0113 (per quarter). The potential welfare benefits from eliminating the variability in
aggregate consumption would therefore amount to 0.013% of aggregate consumption, given
that σ = 2. This is extremely close to the number derived by Lucas (1987).22

This

calculation does not factor in that leisure also fluctuates over the business cycle, a point
recognized by Lucas (1987, p. 28). Eﬀective aggregate consumption fluctuates in the model
by 0.08% (its coeﬃcient of variation×100).23

Thus, the welfare benefits don’t change

appreciably when leisure is taken into account.
20

To be clear, note that utility is defined as a function of aggregate consumption, e
c, not aggregate
consumption net of aggregate labor eﬀort, l , or c = e
c − D(l).
21

In Lucas (1987) this formula gives the exact benefits of reducing variability in aggregate consumption,
given the assumed stochastic process. Aiyagari (1994) uses it as an approximation.
22

Lucas (1987) estimates the coeﬃcient of variation to be 0.013, a number similar to that obtained in the
model economy. Lucas does not do the welfare calculation for σ = 2, just for σ = 1 and σ = 5. Lucas also
uses equation (10). Therefore, plugging his number into this formula gives a welfare cost of 0.017%. The
costs he reports for σ = 1 and σ = 5 are 0.008% and 0.042%.
23

Eﬀective aggregate consumption is defined by c = e
c − D(l), where l is aggregate labor eﬀort.
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5.2.2

General Equilibrium Results

“It is remarkable about how much one can say about the importance of macroeconomics
questions on the basis of preferences alone,” Lucas (1987, p. 20) has noted. So, how do
general equilibrium considerations refine this answer? To address this question, let
Eb [

∞
P

β t U (ct )],

t=0

represent the expected utility for an agent living in the economy with business cycles shocks.24
Similarly, let
En [

∞
P

β t U(ct )],

t=0

denote the expected utility for an agent living in the economy with no business cycles shocks;
i.e., one where σ λ = 0 and E[exp(λ)] = 1. So how much would an agent have to be
compensated to move from the economy without business cycle shocks to the one with
them. This compensating variation, $, is defined (in proportional terms ) by the equation
Eb [

∞
P

β t U (ct )] = En [

t=0

∞
P

β t U($ct )].

t=0

Given the form of the momentary utility, $ can be expressed simply by
P
Eb [ ∞
β t c1−σ
] 1/(1−σ)
t
Pt=0
.
$={
∞
t 1−σ }
En [ t=0 β ct ]

For the model economy $ − 1 = 0.0056. Thus, an agent would be willing to pay 0.56% of

his consumption in order to move to the economy with aggregate fluctuations! Consequently,
the actual benefits from eliminating aggregate fluctuations are much lower (they are actually
a loss here) than the potential benefits reported by Lucas (1987). The Lucas calculations
were intended as an upper bound on the welfare benefits of eliminating aggregate fluctuations,
a fact often forgotten.25
24
25

Now, c is defined as individual consumption net of the disutility of working so that c = e
c − D(l).

To quote Lucas (1987, p. 27): “I want to propose taking these numbers seriously as giving the orderof-magnitude of the potential marginal social product of additional advances in business cycle theory – or
more accurately, as a loose upper bound, since there is no reason to think that eliminating all consumption
variability is either a feasible or desirable objective of policy.”

24

Although the exact computation is cumbersome the basic intuition for this results is fairly
simple and can be understood by looking at the first panel in Figure 1. The agent desires
to work when high values for ε or λ are drawn and search when draws are low. Hence, an
agent’s expected lifetime utility is given by the outer envelope of the S and W curves. Since
this envelope is convex the agent likes risk.26

In response to a mean-preserving spread in

risk the agent becomes choosier about the job he accepts. He now has better odds of drawing
a good job prospect. This is true for drawing bad jobs as well, but the agent has the option
of rejecting them. An example of this basic mechanism for a simplified environment is
provided in the Appendix.

6

Conclusions

A search model of equilibrium unemployment was developed here. Job opportunities are
subject to both aggregate and idiosyncratic productivity shocks. Each period a worker
decides whether to stay with his current job or quit and search for a better one. Likewise, a
unemployed person chooses whether to accept his current job oﬀer or to continue searching
for a better prospect. Financial markets are incomplete so individuals must self insure
against the possibility of unemployment by building up their savings.
The framework is successful in accounting for some key labor market regularities, both at
the macro and micro levels. The model is calibrated to match the average rate and duration
of U.S. unemployment. It can be judged on how well it matches other features of the data.
Consider the micro-level findings first. In the U.S. most spells of unemployment last less
than a month. The model is consistent with these rapid exit rates from unemployment. Additionally, the model also successfully mimics the impact that a spell of unemployment has
both on subsequent wages and future spells of unemployment. The pattern of individuallevel income dynamics generated by the model fits the U.S. data well. In the U.S. data
26

The W curve is in fact slightly convex because the reduced-form production function is convex in the
shock, as seen in equation (19). Even if W were concave, the eﬀect of the kink imparted from the max[W, S]
operation works to put a nonconcave zone in an agent’s expected lifetime utility.
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consumption drops significantly when an individual enters unemployment. This same drop
in consumption, accompanied by lower welfare, takes place in the model when agents become unemployed. Finally, the model predicts that changes in the unemployment insurance
replacement ratio have a significant impact on both the average rate and duration of unemployment. At the macro level, the model does quite well in duplicating the standard set
of business cycle facts summarizing fluctuations in output, consumption, investment and
hours worked. It also replicates the countercyclical nature of the unemployment rate and
its duration, as well as the movements in the flows into and out of unemployment. Last,
the model can be used to gauge the welfare cost of business cycles. In search-theoretic
models aggregate fluctuations may actually improve welfare, notwithstanding the absence of
complete markets.
Naturally, the model can be improved. In the U.S. flows between employment and
nonparticipation may be as large as flows between employment and unemployment. A
home state, representing withdrawal from the labor market, could be added. A home state
may also help the model replicate the procyclical nature of flows into employment, and
the negative correlation between employment inflows and outflows. There are also some
important features of the labor market that the model is not equipped to address. The
model abstracts from vacancies; the number of new job openings always equals the number
of unemployed workers. This prevents the model from confronting regularities such as the
negative relation between vacancies and unemployment (the Beveridge curve). One way to
proceed here may be to build a bilateral search model where entrepreneurs search for workers
and workers search for entrepreneurs. With a home state the number of entrepreneurs and
workers in the labor market would be variable. A vacancy occurs whenever an entrepreneur is
searching for a worker. For a job to be filled both the parties must agree. Here, a job is like a
marriage between the entrepreneur and the worker. A separation is really a divorce between
the entrepreneur and worker. Additionally, such a framework will permit a distinction
between quits and layoﬀs. A quit occurs when the worker severs the relationship with the
entrepreneur, while a layoﬀ happens when the entrepreneur terminates the relationship.
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A

Appendix

A.1

Literature Review

One widely used class of unemployment models builds upon the influential matching paradigm
of Mortensen and Pissarides (1994). Examples that incorporate this paradigm into real business cycle models include Andolfatto (1996) and Merz (1995). The Andolfatto (1996) model
does well at mimicking the Beveridge curve, the statistical relationship between unemployment and vacancies. Den Haan, Ramey and Watson (2000) endogenize the job destruction
rate in this framework by modelling the employment relationship. They argue that this
improves the model’s propagation mechanism: there is an amplified and more persistent
response of macroaggregates to shocks. The Mortensen and Pissarides framework has recently been evaluated by Cole and Rogerson (1999). Alvarez and Veracierto (1998) cross a
version of the Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) framework with the well-known Hopenhayn
and Rogerson (1993) industry dynamics model. Here an unemployed worker can improve
the odds of getting a job by expending some labor eﬀort. They also allow for incomplete
markets.
The model in this paper belongs to a another class of models which features search
with incomplete markets. Wright (1986) is an example of an early general equilibrium
search model. Other examples of prior work along these lines includes Andolfatto and
Gomme (1996), Hansen and Imrohoroglu (1992), Ljundqvist and Sargent (1998), and Zhang
(1995). These papers study the eﬀects of unemployment insurance. Linear utility is used by
Ljundqvist and Sargent (1998), hence the completeness of markets is not an issue. Andolfatto
and Gomme (1996) model the institutional detail of the Canadian unemployment insurance
system. An novel feature of their analysis is that they allow for nonparticipation in the
labor force. They do not allow for personal asset holdings. The Hansen and Imrohoroglu
(1992) paper abstracts from physical capital. The features omitted from these papers are
not essential to the analyses; a line must be drawn somewhere in any abstraction. None of
this work incorporates aggregate uncertainty, a significant complexity that is necessary for
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undertaking business cycle analysis.

A.2

Computation

The algorithm used to compute the model’s competitive equilibrium approximates the wealth
distribution, Z, by a limited set of statistics, such as a set of points characterizing a frequency
distribution or a set of moments — see Den Haan (1997) or Krusell and Smith (1998). A
law of motion is also specified for the statistics characterizing Z. In line with the findings of
Krusell and Smith (1998), it will be assumed that approximating the wealth distribution Z
by its means is adequate for the analysis. Denote the mean level of the capital stock by k so
R
that k = adZ(a, ε)dadε. In order to solve the model parametric forms must be specified
for the law of motion for the aggregate capital stock, the equilibrium interest rate, and the

level of taxes. Assume that the aggregate capital stock has a law of motion of the following
form:
k0 = κ0 + κ1 k + κ2 λ = K(k,λ),

(11)

and that the equilibrium interest rate and tax functions can be written as
ln r = ι0 + ι1 ln k + ι2 λ = ln R(k,λ),

(12)

ln τ = ϑ0 + ϑ1 ln k + ϑ2 λ = ln T (k,λ).

(13)

and

A.2.1

Computing the Model’s General Equilibrium

The algorithm for computing the solution to the model with aggregate shocks proceeds as
follows.
1. Initialization. Generate n(m + 1) normally distributed random variables. Here n
represents the number of periods in the simulation and m is the number of agents.
Initialize each agent i’s asset holdings at some level, say ai ,0 . This could be done in
accordance with the stationary distribution obtained from the deterministic version of
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the model. Next, an initial guess for the laws of motion for the aggregate capital stock,
interest rate and lump-sum taxes is made:
k0 = κ00 + κ01 k + κ02 λ,

ln r = ι00 + ι01 ln k + ι02 λ,
and
ln τ = ϑ00 + ϑ01 ln k + ϑ02 λ.
A good guess for the ι’s and ϑ’s comes from (17) and (18) below. A good guess for κ00
and κ11 may come from the law of motion for the standard neoclassical growth model.
2. Computing the Sample Path (Iteration j + 1) . The first step is to solve the dynamic
programming problems for workers and searchers, taking as given the law of motions
for the aggregate capital stock, the equilibrium interest rate and lump-sum taxes:
kt+1 = κj0 + κj1 kt + κj2 λt ,

(14)

ln rt = ιj0 + ιj1 ln kt + ιj2 λt ,

(15)

ln τ t = ϑj0 + ϑj1 ln kt + ϑj2 λt .

(16)

and

This gives a solution for the value functions W j+1 and S j+1 . The procedure for obtaining these solutions is discussed in detail in the section below. Now, suppose that
agent i0 s state in period t is characterized by (ai,t , εi,t , λt , kt ). To compute his state for
t + 1:
(a) Check whether W j+1 (ai,t , εi,t , λt , kt ) > S j+1 (ai,t , λt , kt ) to determine whether agent
i will work or not in the current period.
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(b) Compute the agent’s asset holding for period t + 1, or ai,t+1 . If the agent is a
worker compute his asset holdings for period t + 1, or ai,t+1 , using the decision
rule ai,t+1 = Aw,j+1 (ai,t , εi,t , λt , kt ). Alternatively, one could solve the worker’s
decision problem at the point (at , εi,t , λt , kt ). Note that worker i will hire capital
in the amount ki,t = K(εi,t , λt , rt ).
(c) If agent i is a searcher compute his asset holdings using decision rule ai,t+1 =
As,j+1 (ai,t , λt , kt ). Again, one could instead solve the searcher’s decision problem
at the point (ai,t , λt , kt ). A searcher hires no capital so that ki,t = 0.
P
(d) The aggregate supply of capital stock can be computed by calculating m
i=0 ai,t =
Pm
kt . The demand for capital is calculated by computing i=0 ki,t . If i is a worker
ki,t = Const exp(εi,t + λt )(1+θ)/[θ(1−α)] ×(1/rt )(α+θ)/[θ(1−α)] , otherwise ki,t = 0.

Therefore, the equilibrium interest rate can be computed from the formula
rt = [

Const P
exp(εi,t + λt )(1+θ)/[θ(1−α)] ]θ(1−α)/(α+θ) ,
kt i∈Wt

(17)

where Wt is the set of worker’s indices.

(e) Similarly, the budget balancing lump-sum tax is given by
τt = µ

m − #Wt
,
#Wt

(18)

where # denotes the number of elements in a set.
3. Updating the Aggregate Law of Motion. By collecting the time series {kt }nt=0 and
{λt , rt , τ t }nt=0 revised aggregate laws of motion can be computed by running the fol-

lowing regressions27
j+1
j+1
kt+1 = κj+1
+ κj+1
(k,λ),
0
1 kt + κ2 λt = K
27

The R2 of these regressions is in practice very close to one, after the first few iterations. Theoretically
the lagged value of the aggregate unemployment rate should have been included as a state variable as well.
This would have increased significantly the computational burden while increasing the explanatory power
of these regressions only slightly. While this is comforting, it is hard to say whether including the lagged
unemployment rate as a state variable matters without doing the full analysis. At this point in time, the
general applicability of the numerical method used here is an open question.
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j+1
ln rt = ιj+1
+ ιj+1
ln kt + ιj+1
(k,λ),
0
1
2 λt = ln R

j+1
ln τ t = ϑj+1
+ ϑj+1
ln kt + ϑj+1
(k,λ).
0
1
2 λt = ln T

4. Step 2 should be repeated using the revised laws of motion until dist([κj+1 , ιj+1 , ϑj+1 ], [κj , ιj , ϑj ]) <
tol.
A.2.2

Computing the Value Functions

In Step 1 of the algorithm the value functions W j+1 and S j+1 needed to be computed.
A loop is nested within the main algorithm to do this. Suppose one had a guess for the
functions (11), (12) and (13) as given by (14), (15) and (16). Given this guess the dynamic
programming problems P(1) and P(2) can be solved. In particular the worker’s problem
would have the general form
W j+1 (a, ε, λ, k) = max
{U (c) +
c,a0 ,k,l
Z
β max[W j+1 (a0 , ε0 , λ0 , Kj (k, λ)), S j+1 (a0 , λ0 , Kj (k,λ))]
×dG(ε0 |ε)dF1 (λ0 |λ)dε0 dλ0 },

subject to
c + a0 = Y (ε, λ; Rj (k, λ)) + [1 + Rj (k, λ)]a − T j (k, λ),
where the functions Rj , T j and Kj are defined by (15), (16) and (14). The searcher’s problem
would appear as
S j+1 (a, λ, k) = max
{U (c) +
c,a0 ,k,l
Z
β max[W j+1 (a0 , ε0 , λ0 , Kj (k, λ)), S j+1 (a0 , λ0 , Kj (k,λ))]dH(ε0 )dF (dλ0 |λ)dε0 dλ0 },
subject to
c + a0 = [1 + Rj (k, λ)]a + µ.
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The functions W and S need not be concave, because the operators defined by P(1) and
P(2) do not map concave functions into strictly concave ones. To see why, consider two
strictly concave functions X(a) and Y (a). The function Z(a) = max[X(a), Y (a)], however,
may not be concave. For example, let X(a) = −a1−σx /(1 − σ x) and Y (a) = −a1−σy /(1 − σ y ),
with σ x = 2 and σ y = 1.5. Figure 11 plots the two functions. Observe that their outer
envelope, or Z(a), is not concave due to the depression at the point where X and Z intersect.
Concavity is a highly desirable property both for theoretical and computational reasons.
For instance, theoretically C w and C s are increasing in a if and only if W and S are strictly
concave, a fact demonstrated in Section 2.1. Computationally, when W and S are strictly
concave, solving the first-order conditions to P(1) and P(2) is enough to find the decision
rules. Furthermore, when W and S are well-behaved strictly concave functions they can
be approximated well by low-order polynomials. So, how can the functions W and S be
made strictly concave? The trick employed here is to use the idiosyncratic shock ε to
render the functions W and S strictly concave. To see how this works, add a continuously
distributed random variable ε to the function X in the above example. Specifically, define
Y by X(a, ε) = −(a + ε)1−σx /(1 − σ x ). Let ε be distributed normally with E[ε] = 0. Figure
12 plots Z(a) = E[max[X(a, ε), Y (a)]] when the standard deviation for ε varies over 0.05,
0.10, and 0.15 (or so that the standard deviation of ε is approximately 5, 10 and 15% of the
value for a at the kink). Increases in the variance of ε smooth out the depression in Z(a)
and make it more concave.
In order to solve these problems the functions W j+1 and S j+1 are approximated by loworder polynomials, specifically quadratics. First, a grid was specified over the model’s state
space for the continuous variables a, ε, and k – recall that λ only has three values contained
in the some set L. Denote these sets of grid points by A, E, and K. Second, an initial guess
is made for the second-degree polynomials used to approximate W j+1 and S j+1 . Denote this
guess by W j+1,0 and S j+1,0 . A good initial guess may be the solution for the value functions
obtained on the previous iteration of the main algorithm, or W j and S j . Third, given a guess
for W j+1 and S j+1 at the i-th iteration of this inner loop, or W j+1,i and S j+1,i , problems

36

P(1) and P(2) are solved at each point in the set A × E × L × K by using this guess on the

righthand side of P(1) and P(2). This results in lefthand values for W j+1 and S j+1 at each
of these points. Fourth, two new second-degree polynomials are then fitted to these points
via least squares.28 The new functions are represented by W j+1,i+1 and S j+1,i+1 . Fifth, the
procedure is repeated until convergence is obtained.
Remark The deterministic version of the model can easily be computed by just solving this
inner loop for computing W and S for a given value of r, which is adjusted iteratively until
the demand and supply of capital are equated. Here W and S are just functions of a and ε
so there is no need to find the laws of motion (11), (12) and (13).

A.3

Properties of W and S

A few properties about W and S are established here.29
Lemma 1 The functions W and S exist, are continuously increasing in a, and W is continuously increasing in ε.
Proof. Consider the mapping defined by equations P(1) and P(2): (W j+1 , S j+1 ) = M(W j , S j ).
By applying the Theorem of the Maximum it is straightforward to see that the operator M
maps W j ’s and S j ’s that are continuous in a and ε into W j+1 ’s and S j+1 ’s that are also continuous in a and ε. By Blackwell’s suﬃcient conditions the operator M defines a contraction
mapping in the space of continuous functions with the uniform norm. Hence, W and S exist
and are continuous functions (in a and ε).
Let

Uw (a, a0 , ε, ·) = U(Y (ε) + (1 + r)a − τ − a0 ),
28

The R2 of these regressions is in practice very close to one after the first few iterations.

29

The key reference on these properties is Stokey and Lucas with Prescott (1989).
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Us (a, a0 , ·) = U (µ + (1 + r)a − a0 ),

Qw (a0 , ε, ·) =

R

max[W j (a0 , ε0 , ·), S j (a0 , ·)]dG(ε0 |ε)dF (λ0 |λ)dε0 dλ0 ,

Qs (a0 , ·) =

R

max[W j (a0 , ε0 , ·), S j (a0 , ·)]dH(ε0 )dF (λ0 |λ)dε0 dλ0 .

and

Now, it needs to be shown that the operator M maps W ’s and S’s that are nondecreasing
in a into ones that are increasing in a. To see this, consider two levels of asset holdings
a1 < a2 . So the question is: If W j and S j are nondecreasing in a then will W j+1 and S j+1
be increasing in a? The answer is yes since
W j+1 (a1 , ε, ·) = max
{Uw (a1 , a0 , ε, ·) + βQw (a0 , ε, ·)}
0
a ≥a

< max
{Uw (a2 , a0 , ε, ·) + βQw (a0 , ε, ·)} ≡ W j+1 (a2 , ε, ·).
0
a ≥a

A similar argument can be used to establish that S j+1 (a1 , ·) < S j+1 (a2 , ·).

To show that W j+1 is increasing in ε consider two levels of idiosyncratic shock ε1 < ε2

It is easy to see that if W j is nondecreasing in ε then W j+1 is increasing in ε as
{Uw (a, a0 , ε1 , ·) + βQw (a0 , ε1 , ·)}
W j+1 (a, ε1 , ·) = max
0
a ≥a

< max
{Uw (a, a0 , ε2 , ·) + βQw (a0 , ε2 , ·)} ≡ W j+1 (a, ε2 , ·),
0
a ≥a

where the second line follows from the facts that (i) Y (ε1 ) < Y (ε2 ) and (ii) the distribution
function G(ε0 |ε2 ) stochastically dominates the one G(ε0 |ε1 ) so that
R

R

max[W j (a0 , ε0 , ·), S j (a0 , ·)]dG(ε0 |ε1 )dF (λ0 |λ)dε0 dλ0 ≤
max[W j (a, ε0 , ·), S j (a0 , ·)]dG(ε0 |ε2 )dF (λ0 |λ)dε0 dλ0 .
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A.4

An Example where Welfare can Increase with Risk

Let U (e
c − D(l)) = e
c − l1+θ /(1 + θ), O(k, l; ε) = exp(ε)k α l1−α , and δ = µ = 0. Ignore the

borrowing constraint. In a stationary equilibrium this will imply that 1 + r = 1/β. Next,
define the return to working by

Y (ε) = max[exp(ε)k α l1−α − l1+θ /(1 + θ) − rk]
l,k

(19)

= [(1 − α)(1+θ)/θ θ/(1 + θ)][αβ/(1 − β)]α(1+θ)/[θ(1−α)]
× exp{(1 + θ)/[θ(1 − α)]ε}.
Note that Y is strictly positive, increasing and convex in ε. Let a searcher draw his ε from the
cumulative distribution function H : [−∞, ε] → [0, 1]. For a worker, let ε0 evolve according
to


 ε,
with probability p (job continues),
ε0 =
 −∞, with probability 1 − p, (job ends).

This setup is as close as one can get to the model in text while retaining a tractable solution.
The Bellman equation for a searcher is
e
f (a0 , ε0 ), S(a
e 0 )]}},
S(a)
= max
{(1 + r)a − a0 + βE{max[W
0

(20)

f (a0 , ε0 ), S(a
e 0 )]}}.
f (a, ε) = max{Y (ε) + (1 + r)a − a0 + βE{max[W
W
0

(21)

a

while the one for a worker is
a

Given the linear form of the utility function these programming problems can be significantly
simplified.
Lemma 6 The value functions (20) and (21) have the forms

and

e
S(a)
= S + (1 + r)a,

(22)

f(a, ε) = W (ε) + (1 + r)a.
W

(23)
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Proof. It is readily verifiable that when a guess of this form is inserted into the righthand
sides of (20) and (21) a solution of this form is obtained on the lefthand sides of these
equations.
Note from (20) and (21) that S and W will satisfy
S = βE{max[W (ε0 ), S]},

(24)

W (ε) = Y (ε) + βE{max[W (ε0 ), S]}.

(25)

and

Clearly then an agent will choose to work or to search depending on whether W (ε) is greater
than or less than S.30 Define the threshold shock J by the equation
W (J) = S.

(26)

Solutions for S and W can now be obtained. Using (24), (25) and (26) it is easy to see
that
S=β

R

W (ε0 )dH(ε0 ) + βH(J)S,

(27)

J

and

W (ε) = Y (ε) + βpW (ε) + β(1 − p)S.

(28)

Note from (28) that
S=

Y (J)
.
1−β

(29)

and
W (ε) =
30

Y (ε) + β(1 − p)S
.
1 − βp

f (a, ε) is greater than or less S(a),
e
Or equivalently, depending on whether W
by (22) and (23).
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(30)

The solution will be complete if a condition characterizing Y (J) or J can be found. To
this end, use (27) and (30) to get
R Y (ε0 ) + β(1 − p)S
S=β [
]dH(ε0 ) + βH(J)S,
1
−
βp
J

or
S=β
which implies

R Y (ε0 )
β 2 (1 − p)S[1 − H(J)]
dH(ε0 ) +
+ βH(J)S,
1 − βp
J 1 − βp

R Y (ε0 )
β 2 (1 − p)S βH(J)(1 − β)S
0
S=β
dH(ε ) +
+
.
1 − βp
1 − βp
J 1 − βp

Equation (29) then allows this to be rewritten as

R
1 − βp − β 2 (1 − p)
[
− βH(J)]Y (J) = β Y (ε0 )dH(ε0 ),
1−β
J

so that

[1 + β(1 − p) − βH(J)]Y (J) = β

R

Y (ε0 )dH(ε0 ).

(31)

J

Lemma 7 There exits a unique J solving (31) – or equivalently (26).
Proof. Integrating the righthand side of (31) by parts generates

β

R

J

Y (ε0 )dH(ε0 ) = βY (ε0 )H(ε0 )|εJ − β

Rε

Y1 (ε0 )H(x)dx

J

= βY (ε) − βY (J)H(J) − β
Therefore (31) can be rewritten as

[1 + β(1 − p)]Y (J) = βY (ε) − β

Rε

Rε

Y1 (ε0 )H(x)dx.

J

Y1 (ε0 )H(ε0 )dε0 .

J

The lefthand side of this equation is increasing in J and has slope [1 + β(1 − p)]Y1 (J). It
starts at 0 (when J = −∞) and rises to [1 + β(1 − p)]Y (ε) = βY (ε) + (1 − βp)Y (ε). The
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righthand side is also increasing in J but has a lower slope βY1 (J)H(J). It begins at the
R
higher intercept β Y (ε)dH(ε) and increases to the lower point βY (ε).31

So the question is how will an increase in risk aﬀect the agent? To answer the question

the concept of an increase in risk needs to operationalized.
Assumption Let the cumulative distribution function H be smaller than H in terms of
second-degree stochastic dominance. Also, assume that H and H have the same means.
(Note the variance of ε is higher with the distribution function H than with H).
The eﬀect of an increase in risk on the reservation wage and an agent’s welfare can now be
established.
Lemma 8 The reservation wage, J, is higher with H than with H (i.e., the threshold wage
rises with mean-preserving spread in H).
Proof. It is suﬃcient to show that for a given value of J the righthand side of (31) is higher
with H than with H. Formally, it is required that

βY (ε) − β
or

R

J

Y1 (ε0 )H(ε0 )dε0 ≥ βY (ε) − β

β

R

J

R

Y1 (ε0 )H(ε0 )dε0 ,

J

Y1 (ε0 )[H(ε0 ) − H(ε0 )]dε0 ≥ 0.

Integration by parts then yields

Rε

J

0

0

0

Y1 (ε )[H(ε ) − H(ε )]dε

0

0

= Y1 (ε )
Rε

Rε0

[H(x) − H(x)]dx |εJ

−∞

0

− Y11 (ε )
J
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Rε0

[H(x) − H(x)]dxdε0 .

−∞

Clearly for search to be optimal, at least in some states of nature, it must be the case that Y (ε) > 0.
It follows that [1 + β(1 − p)]Y (ε) = βY (ε) + (1 − βp)Y (ε) > βY (ε).
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Now, the fact that H and H have the same means implies that
Hence, the above equation can be simplified to
Rε

J

Y1 (ε0 )[H(ε0 ) − H(ε0 )]dε0 = −Y1 (J)
Rε

RJ

− Y11 (ε )
J

−∞

[H(x) − H(x)]dx = 0.

[H(x) − H(x)]dx

−∞
0

Rε

Rε0

[H(x) − H(x)]dxdε0 ≥ 0.

−∞

The direction of the inequality follows from the facts that Y is an increasing convex function
Rz
and that −∞[H(x) − H(x)]dx ≤ 0 for all z by the definition of second-degree stochastic
dominance.

Proposition 9 The individual is better oﬀ with H than H (i.e., welfare rises with a meanpreserving spread in H).
Proof. From (29) it is apparent that a searcher must be better oﬀ since S is increasing in
J. Then (30) implies that the same is true for a worker, since W rises with S.32

32

f are also increasing in J [by (22) and (23)].
This implies that Se and W
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Table 1: Baseline Parameterization
Parameter

Benchmark Value

Description

β

1/1.061/8

Time Preference

σ

2

Risk Aversion

θ

10

Inverse of Labor Supply Elasticity

α

0.36

Share of Capital in Production

δ

0.006

Depreciation Rate

0.5

Replacement Ratio (UI)

ρλ

0.98

Persistence, Aggregate Shock

σλ

0.009

Std. Dev. Innovation, Agg. Shock

ρε

0.9

Persistence, Worker’s Shock

σε

0.052

Std. Dev. Innovation, Worker’s Shock

0.085

Std. Dev. Innovation, Searcher’s Shock

Preferences

Technology

Policy
η

Shocks
Aggregate

Workers

Searchers
σν
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Table 2: Eﬀects of Job Displacement
Post-Displacement

Post-Displacement

Years After

Unemployment

Change in Wages

Displacement

(weeks)

(%)

Data 1

Model

Data 1

Model

0

8.35

9.89

-10.6

-19.6

1

4.32

3.44

-17.5

-21.2

2

2.08

1.08

-16.2

-22.1

3

1.45

0.28

-14.9

-21.0

4

1.27

0.15

-14.7

-16.7

1

Ruhm (1991, Table 1)

Table 3: Income Distribution
Parameter

Data1

υ0

-3.564

-3.459

υ1

0.527

0.501

υ2

0.081

0.067

Std. Dev. (uit )

0.241

0.186

1

Model

Heaton and Lucas (1996), Table A2
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Table 4: Comparative Statics Exercises
Benchmark Value

New Value

Unemployment Rate

σ ε = 0.052 × 0.80 = 0.042

4.9

σ ε = 0.052 × 1.2 = 0.062

7.2

ρε = 0.9 × 0.95 = 0.855

5.5

ρε = 0.9 × 1.05 = 0.945

6.3

σ ν = 0.085 × 0.80 = 0.68

5.7

σ ν = 0.085 × 1.2 = 0.102

6.8

η = 0.7

13.9

Worker
σ ε = 0.025

ρε = 0.9

Searcher
σ ν = 0.085

Government
η = 0.5
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Table 5: Standard Business Cycle Facts
Variable

Rel. Std. Dev. (%) Corr. with Output

U.S. Quarterly Data – 1954:1 - 1991:2 1
Output

1.72

1.00

Consumption

0.74

0.83

Investment

2.97

0.79

Hours

0.98

0.92

Labor Productivity 0.42

0.34

Model
Output

1.10

1.00

Consumption

0.69

0.97

Investment

3.00

0.95

Hours

0.61

0.91

Labor Productivity 0.52
0.87
Source: Cooley and Prescott (1995, Table 1.1)
1

All standard deviations (except output) are reported relative to output.
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Table 6: Labor Market Facts
Variable

Rel. Std. Dev. (%) Corr. with Output

U.S. Quarterly Data
Employment1

0.82

0.89

Average Weekly Hours1

0.28

0.62

Unemployment2

7.68

-0.87

Duration2

6.87

-0.37

Unemployment – Flow In

3.113

-0.784

Unemployment – Flow Out 2.503

-0.514

Employment — Flow In

3.845

0.186

Employment — Flow Out

8.425

-0.656

Corr(U. Flow In, U. Flow Out) = 0.644
Corr(E. Flow In, E. Flow Out) = -0.326
Model
Employment

0.62

0.80

Average Weekly Hours

0.26

0.24

Unemployment

7.27

-0.80

Duration

3.60

-0.14

Unemployment – Flow In

7.95

-0.69

Unemployment – Flow Out 6.87

-0.43

Employment – Flow In

6.87

-0.43

Employment – Flow Out

7.95

-0.69

Corr(U. Flow In, U. Flow Out) = 0.09
Corr(E. Flow In, E. Flow Out) = 0.09
1
Cooley and Prescott (1995), Table 1.1; period 1954:1-1991:2.
2
3

Computed for period 1954:1-1991:2.

Merz (1996), Table 1; period 1959:1-1988:2.
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4

Merz (1996), Table 2; period 1959:1-1981:4.

5

Merz (1996), Table 3; period 1959:1-1981:4.

6

Merz (1996), Table 4; period 1959:1-1981:4.
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FIGURE 1: Determination of Consumption.
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FIGURE 2: Cumulative Hazard Rate.
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FIGURE 3: Threshold Rules – Aggregate Shock.
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FIGURE 4: Threshold Rules – Aggregate Capital Stock.

Idiosyncratic Shock

0.00

-0.02

-0.04

High Capital
Low Capital

-0.06

-0.08

0

50

100

150

Assets

200

250

300

FIGURE 5: Impulse Response, Positive Shock – Consumption, Investment, and Output.
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FIGURE 6: Impulse Response, Positive Shock – Employment, Unemployment, and
Average Hours Worked.
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FIGURE 7: Impulse Response, Positive Shock – Duration of Employment, Flow into
Unemployment and Flow out of Employment.
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FIGURE 8: Impulse Response, Negative Shock – Consumption, Investment, and Output.
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FIGURE 9: Impulse Response, Negative Shock – Employment, Unemployment, and
Average Hours Worked.
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FIGURE 10: Impulse Response, Negative Shock – Duration of Employment, Flow into
Unemployment and Flow out of Employment.
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FIGURE 11: X(a) and Y(a).
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FIGURE 12: Smoothing Effect of Uncertainty.
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